We analyze the effect of managerial compensation schemes and organizational structure on competitive behavior in imperfectly competitive product markets. Previous research suggests that, in cases of strategic substitutability, firms tend to choose organizational structures and compensation systems that commit the firm to behave aggressively in the product market, reducing firm and industry profits. In contrast, we show that, while compensation and structure in isolation lead to excessive aggressiveness, the combination of these two internal choice variables may reverse the outcome and remove the typical prisoner's dilemma. As a result, we demonstrate that organizational design can be used as a commitment device to reduce competitive rivalry.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the relationship between firms' organizational design and interfirm rivalry. Specifically, we explore how the inside of the firm-its actors, organization, and compensation systems-and the outside of the firm-productmarket competition between rivals in the same industry-are interrelated. The objective of this study is to understand better both the forces shaping rivalry and those shaping organizational design.
A stream of economic research, referred to as strategic incentives theory, has examined how managerial incentives affect competitive interaction. The seminal papers in this field are Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) , and Vickers (1985) . Typical strategic incentives models consist of a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms determine some element of the organizational design, e.g., the managers' compensation scheme or the organizational structure, and in the second stage, managers compete in an imperfectly competitive product market. 1 Organizational design serves as a commitment device, credibly binding the firm to more or less aggressive behavior. The main conclusion from this stream of research critically depends on the nature of competition. When firms choose output and, hence, choices are strategic substitutes, the firm wants to motivate its manager to increase output in order to decrease the output of rival firms. In contrast, when managers choose prices and, hence, choices are strategic complements, the firm wants its manager to increase the firm's price, which, in turn, leads rival firms to increase their prices. While the intensity of rivalry thus diminishes in the case of strategic complements, in the substitutes case, the strategic use of organizational design leads to a prisoner's dilemma; the desire to commit to high output results in excessive aggressiveness and reduced firm and industry profits. Fershtman and Judd (1987) explore the case in which the manager's compensation is based on a weighted average of profits and sales. In stage 1, the firm determines the relative weight on profits and sales. Stage 2 is a Cournot quantity game. They show that firms, in equilibrium, provide a positive weight on sales, thus making the managers behave more aggressively, i.e., sell more products at a lower price. A central notion in this stream of research, dating back to Schelling (1960) , is that firms seek to gain from distorting their managers' incentives.
The effect of structure on managerial incentives has been studied mostly in the context of channel structure, rather than organizational structure (e.g., McGuire
and Staelin 1983, Moorthy 1988, Bonanno and Vickers 1988) . In the first stage, two manufacturing firms choose whether to sell their products through retailers (separation) or market the products themselves (integration). In the case of separation, firms subsequently set a wholesale price. In the last stage, retailers compete in strategic substitutes or complements. Because of double marginalization, vertical separation effectively increases prices, decreases output, and, hence, softens competition (Tirole, 1988) . However, in the case of strategic substitutes, vertical integration generally dominates separation, which again leads to a prisoner's dilemma. 2 A potential shortcoming of the extant literature is that each individual paper studies either compensation systems or structure, but not both. Arguably, this may result in misleading conclusions, because firms typically make decisions about both their managerial remuneration system and their organizational structure. If the interaction between compensation systems and structure is nontrivial, the combination of these two organizational features may generate unexpected results. To further our understanding of the relationship between the inside and the outside of the organization, we develop a model in which both organizational structure and managerial compensation systems are endogenized. In the model, two firms first determine whether their organizational structure is centralized, or decentralized vertically, i.e., whether the production and marketing departments are treated as a single profit center or as two distinct profit centers. Profit centers have the autonomy to take operating decisions (Williamson, 1985) . Subsequently, firms choose whether to use relative performance evaluation as a basis for their managerial remuneration system. Relative performance evaluation is a compensation scheme in which the performance of the manager is compared to the performance of rival firms by placing a nonzero weight on the rivals' profits (see, for example, Holmström, 1979 , in an agency context, and Miller and Pazgal, 2001 , in a strategic incentives context). If the decentralized structure is implemented, the production and marketing departments negotiate the transfer price used in the compensation scheme to establish the performance of each profit center. 3 The last stage of the model is Cournot quantity competition. Thus, the model is a multi-stage, non-repeated game.
The choice of the specific forms of structure and remuneration-vertical (de)centralization and relative performance evaluation-could be illustrated by looking at a currently popular management practice, called Value-Based Management (VBM).
VBM is a management approach that emphasizes shareholder value as the driving force of companies, and links reward systems with economic-profit measures. The implementation of VBM "allows the company to effectively decentralize decisionmaking, eliminating the need for frequent intervention from the head office" (Bou- The questions that are addressed in this paper are as follows. How does the combination of organizational structure and compensation systems affect competition, and how does competition affect these two elements of organizational design?
Does the possibility exist to avoid the prisoner's dilemma that occurs when either structure or remuneration systems are studied in isolation? Does the simultaneous endogeneity of structure and compensation systems lead to firm homogeneity, as suggested in previous research, or does it encourage firms to differentiate their organizational form, resulting in firm heterogeneity?
We find that the interaction of organizational structure and compensation systems is nontrivial and may reverse previously found results. Otherwise identical firms may choose different organizational designs, leading to asymmetric subgameperfect equilibria: one firm chooses to decentralize and place a negative weight on rivals' performance, while its centralized rival uses a positive weight. This endogenous firm heterogeneity is associated with a diminished intensity of rivalry, approaching the maximum industry profits, despite the perfectly noncooperative setting. Thus, even though organizational structure and managerial reward systems may each, in isolation, have a detrimental effect on firms' profits, the combination of these two elements of organizational design may actually increase profits.
In the above-mentioned asymmetric equilibrium, the centralized firm sets a compensation scheme which encourages the manager to behave cooperatively, or, more precisely, to maximize industry, rather than firm, profits. For this to be optimal for the centralized firm, the decentralized firm has to set a noncooperative reward system, which compares the performance of the decentralized firm's marketing department with the performance of the rival firm. Given the cooperative behavior of the centralized firm, in the asymmetric equilibrium, the industry realizes maximum attainable profits. The division of the industry profits between both firms depends on the equilibrium reward system of the decentralized firm, which varies with the exogenous bargaining parameter. As the bargaining power of the production de-partment increases, the centralized firm gets a larger share of the industry profits.
In the extreme case that the production department has all the bargaining power, industry profits are shared evenly between the centralized and decentralized firms.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 contains a discussion, an analysis, and some special cases of the model. The results are discussed in Section 4. The proofs of the propositions are included in the Appendix.
Model
There are two firms, indexed i = 1, 2. The stages of the model are as follows.
In stage 1, the firms simultaneously decide whether to centralize 4 In stage 3, if the firm is decentralized, a transfer price w i is determined through negotiations between the production and marketing managers. 5 In stage 4, the marketing managers set the output quantity q i . The market price P of the homogenous good is determined by the total output quantity Q = q 1 + q 2 and market demand. Inverse demand is given by P = a − bQ, a > 0, b > 0. The production costs of firm i are given by cq i , where c is constant and, for simplicity, equals zero. The stages of the model are depicted in Figure 1 . . 5 In our model, transfer prices are thus set in a decentralized fashion. In contrast, Alles and Datar (1998) study the case that CEOs strategically determine transfer prices.
We provide some additional information and notation for each stage.
Stage 1. Decentralization is modeled as vertical separation in production and marketing departments, rather than horizontal separation in product divisions. 6 This choice allows us to draw insights from and contribute to both the vertical integration/separation and the strategic incentives literatures.
If the organizational structure is centralized, i.e., the production and marketing departments are combined and managed by the same manager, no transfer pricing takes place. The organizational structure thus affects the marginal costs as perceived by the manager who decides the market quantity. While the perceived marginal costs equal the transfer price in the case of decentralization, in the case of centralization the perceived and actual marginal costs do not differ.
Stage 2. The incentive contract driving the marketing managers of firm i = 1, 2 has the following form:
Here, π M i are the profits of the focal marketing department, π j (j = 1, 2 6 = i) are the profits of the rival firm, 7 and µ i ∈ < is the weight put on the rival's profits. 8 Departmental profits are defined as follows:
For simplicity, the production manager has a contract based on absolute performance, rather than relative performance (i.e., I P i = π P i ). At this stage, the firm thus chooses µ i to maximize firm profits, given the expected play µ j of its opponent: π i (µ i ) = (P (µ i ) − c)q i (µ i ). 6 For example, Faulí-Oller and Giralt (1995) study horizontal decentralization in a multidivisional firm (without endogenizing organizational structure). 7 As a matter of definition, the unit of comparison for the performance of each marketing department could be either the rival firm as a whole, or the rival marketing department specifically. This choice does not affect the incentives of the manager, because marketing manager i maximizes π M i + µ M i π j , where π j could be defined either as q j P − q j c or q j P − q j w j . Since q j , c, and w j are all treated as constants when marketing manager i solves the optimization problem, both expressions yield the same outcome. The outcome of the game is thus independent of this choice. In the present model, the marketing department's performance is compared to the performance of the rival firm as a whole, which facilitates the analysis of the model. 8 The formalization of relative performance evaluation used in our model was introduced by Salas Fumás (1992).
A positive value for µ i is expected to make marketing manager i less aggressive, i.e., set a smaller output quantity, because he or she is rewarded for an increase in the rival's profits. A negative value for µ i obviously has the opposite effect, because the reward increases as the rival's profits decrease. Finally, µ i = 0 would lead to an incentive that is equal to absolute performance evaluation, putting no weight on the performance of other firms in the industry. 9 Agency theory has provided a rationale for using relative performance evaluation (RPE) with µ i < 0 (see, for example, Holmström, 1979) . Judging a manager's performance against the performance of a peer group in the same industry reduces the effect of common noise on the manager's remuneration. In contrast, if all firms in an industry could credibly commit to setting µ i = 1, the collusive outcome, in which industry profits are maximized, would be attained.
The choice to introduce relative performance evaluation for the marketing department rather than for the production department is inspired by the direct competition between marketing departments, which is absent between production departments.
Moreover, using relative performance evaluation as a means of reducing common noise would be more appropriate for the marketing than production department.
Market uncertainty revealed after production and marketing decisions would affect the output price, and therefore the marketing department's profits, but not the output quantity or the transfer price, thus leaving the production department's profits unchanged.
Stage 3. The transfer price of firm i, reached through negotiation, is assumed to be
where α is an exogenously given parameter, which is equal for both firms (0 ≤ α ≤ Because the two departments are at the same time autonomous and mutually dependent, transfer pricing is necessary to determine the profitability of each department and to achieve accountability. 10 The exogenous parameter α can be interpreted as the relative bargaining power of the production department vis-à-vis the marketing department. If α = 1, the production manager has all the bargaining power and sets a transfer price that will maximize the production department's profits. If α = 0, all the bargaining power resides at the marketing department, which then pays a transfer price equal to marginal costs. Note that this latter case is mathematically equivalent to centralization. 11 The bargaining parameter α could thus be interpreted as a continuous measure of the degree of decentralization.
The relative bargaining power of the production and marketing departments, not modeled in this paper, could be seen as depending on the value added of each department in the value chain. Nash bargaining, then, naturally leads to a division of the rents as modeled by α. Another, complementary, perspective is to assert that bargaining power depends on the administrative heritage of the company (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) . While, in some companies, production traditionally plays a more important role, in other companies marketing, historically, is more dominant.
Of course, these two interpretations may be related.
Stage 4.
Marketing manager i chooses output q i to maximize
The sequence of the modeling stages reflects the time horizon of the decisions that are made at each stage. In most cases, the choice of organizational structure represents a long-term decision, as costly to reverse as a major bricks and mortar investment. The design and implementation of a managerial compensation system represents a medium-term decision, which may be changed more often than the orga- 10 Accountability is considered an important objective in MFV practice. For example, the Dutch ABN AMRO Bank stated, as part of its implementation of MFV, "Full delegation of operational responsibilities to the SBUs is a key ingredient in ABN AMRO's restructuring." (A Concise View, July 2001, p. 15), and "By clearly delegating responsibilities to managers, accountability can unambiguously be established" (Ibidem, p. 7). 11 This observation is also made by Vickers (1985, p. 146).
nizational structure. Finally, pricing and output decisions are short-term decisions that are taken on a day-to-day basis.
The model used in this paper is a game of complete information. We assume, for example, that incentive contracts can be observed by all the involved parties.
Whether this is true empirically obviously depends on the specific situation. In studying strategic incentives in the gasoline industry, Slade (1993) argues that incentive contracts are observable, and could, therefore, be used as a strategic commitment device. Moreover, even if information is incomplete, our results may still hold. Katz (1991) studies a principal-agent model with unobservable contracts, and concludes that these contracts may have commitment value in spite of their unobservability.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the case in which organizational structure is endogenized but compensation systems are treated as exogenously given (Section 3.1).
Then, we endogenize the compensation system, while exploring several exogenously given organizational structures (Sections 3.2 -3.4). Finally, we present and discuss the overall solution to our model, endogenizing both organizational structure and compensation systems (Section 3.5).
Separately analyzing the special cases of our model allows us to link the present model to the existing literature, to create a benchmark with which the solution of the overall model can be compared, and to provide intuition for the building blocks of the model. Moreover, in some specific real-life situations, special cases of our model may be more applicable than the overall model. As mentioned earlier, the choice of organizational structure represents a long-term decision, while the compensation system could be modified in the medium term. Whereas strategic consequences of organizational design are the focus of this paper, many operational rather than strategic considerations may influence the choice of organizational form.
Thus, when evaluating different compensation schemes, senior management often take the existing organizational structure as given. Consequently, if the organizational structure should be considered as exogenously given, the subgames discussed in Sections 3.2 -3.4 are more appropriate, while the overall model (Section 3.5) is more germane to the situation in which decisions about the organizational structure and compensation systems are taken in concert.
Endogenization of organizational structure
In this section, we assume that there is no relative performance evaluation, i.e.,
12 Two firms choose whether to be centralized or to be decentralized, in which case the marketing department pays a negotiated transfer price to the production department. The outcome of this game could be that both firms are centralized i.e., assuming µ i = 0, are denoted with a superscriptb. Non-equilibrium values are denoted without a superscript, but with a subscript referring to the focal firm.
13
The questions we address here are as follows. How does the choice of organizational structure affect the market outcome, e.g., in terms of market price and profitability? What organizational structure is chosen in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the special case explored here?
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that there is no relative performance evaluation, i.e.,
12 This special case of our model can be seen as a reinterpretation of the study of vertical integration and separation by, among others, McGuire and Staelin (1983), Bonanno and Vickers (1988) , and Moorthy (1988) . Our case is different in that we consider vertical separation within a firm (called vertical decentralization), as opposed to vertical separation between firms. 13 For example, q CD is the equilibrium output quantity of a centralized firm with a decentralized competitor. Further, b q CD is the equilibrium output quantity of a centralized firm competing with a decentralized firm, in the absence of relative performance evaluation. Finally, q C is the output quantity of the centralized firm, not necessarily in equilibrium.
(i) Two decentralized firms have profits that are higher than those of two centralized firms, for 0 < α ≤ 1.
(ii) There is a value of α, such that two decentralized firms attain the collusive outcome, absent explicit coordination.
(iii) The subgame-perfect equilibrium of this case is that both firms are centralized ( CC), eliminating the softening effect of decentralization.
It is well-known that vertical separation creates a negative externality (double marginalization) that reduces output (Tirole, 1988) . The positive effect on price is confirmed in a number of empirical studies (discussed in Lafontaine and Slade, 1997 ). This effect also holds in our situation of decentralization within a firm.
14 It is easy to show that the equilibrium industry output becomes smaller-and market price, therefore, higher-the more firms are decentralized. Since the transfer price becomes larger as α gets larger (i.e., the bargaining power of the production manager, relative to the marketing manager, increases), the output reducing effect increases as α increases. The industry output in the standard Cournot context is larger than the monopoly, or perfectly collusive, output. Therefore, the output reduction caused by decentralization has a positive effect on industry and firm profitability.
In fact, there exists a value for α (denoted b α), such that, when both firms are decentralized and α = b α, industry profitability is maximized (each firm obtains half of the monopoly profits). For b α < α ≤ 1, the reduction effect is so large that the industry output is less than the perfectly collusive output, and profitability declines (remaining, nevertheless, larger than standard Cournot). If one firm is decentralized, while the other is centralized, the centralized firm obtains profits that are higher than those of the decentralized firm (the decentralized firm's output reduction benefits the centralized firm, while hurting the decentralized firm). As α increases, the difference between the centralized and decentralized firms' profits increases. Finally, since the case discussed here does not allow for relative performance evaluation, if both firms are centralized, the standard Cournot outcome obtains.
Since there are two firms with two options each, four different cases can be distinguished ( Figure 2) . Figure 2 . Given α, profits per firm as determined by organizational structure.
Solving the special case that µ i = 0 by backwards induction shows that each firm wants to centralize, independent of the structure of the rival (indeed, b
. Centralization is thus the dominant strategy, and CC is the subgame-perfect equilibrium. The general conclusion of the strategic incentives literature-increased aggressiveness in the case of strategic substitutes-thus holds in this special case of our model. We find that firms choose to be centralized, although decentralization could increase profits up to the level of perfect collusion.
The intuition behind this result is that firms want to commit to aggressive behavior knowing that this will induce cooperative behavior from the rival, given the substitutes nature of competition. However, since both firms simultaneously decide to centralize, industry and firm profits decline relative to the decentralization case.
This is an example of the well-known prisoner's dilemma. In the absence of explicit collusive agreements, firms cannot avoid a mutually detrimental outcome.
Endogenization of compensation systems: CC -subgame
We now endogenize compensation systems, while treating the organizational structure as given. In this section, we discuss the situation in which both firms are centralized. This section thus considers a subgame of the overall model (referred to as the CC-subgame). 15 Section 3.3 deals with the case that both firms are decentralized (the DD-subgame). The case in which one firm is decentralized while the other is centralized (the DC-subgame) is discussed in Section 3.4. Hence, the questions addressed in this section are as follows. What incentive contract is chosen in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the special case explored here? How does the use of relative performance evaluation affect the market outcome?
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that both firms are centralized.
(i) In subgame-perfect equilibrium, the incentive parameter used satisfies
(ii) The use of relative performance evaluation increases industry output and decreases industry profits, relative to the standard Cournot outcome.
Relative performance evaluation creates the potential for firms to collude through positively weighing the rival's profits in the manager's objective function. However, in equilibrium, at least one of the firms provides a negative weight on the profits of the rival firm. For example, the unique symmetric solution to the CC -subgame
. This result confirms the conventional wisdom that firms make their managers more aggressive when competing in strategic substitutes. While the equilibrium values of µ i and µ j determine the division of the industry profits over the two competing firms, the total industry output and profits are independent of 15 The model in this section is equivalent to the special case of the model in Salas Fúmas (1992), where managers are assumed to be risk neutral. Salas Fúmas finds three solutions: (µ 1 , µ 2 ) = (0, −1), (−1, 0), and (− the specific value of µ i and µ j . Relative to standard Cournot without relative performance evaluation, total industry output increases and industry profits decrease.
Hence, equivalent to the case discussed in Section 3.1, endogenizing compensation systems leads to a prisoner's dilemma, decreasing each firm's profits.
Endogenization of compensation systems: DD-subgame
While decentralization makes firms behave less aggressively, decreasing output, relative performance evaluation (with µ i < 0) has the opposite effect: it encourages managers to behave more aggressively, increasing output. In this section, we analyze the net effect of these two opposite forces. Is the effect of decentralization stronger, reducing output, or does relative performance prevail over decentralization, increasing output? Proposition 3.3. Suppose that both firms are decentralized. The unique symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized as follows:
(i) If α = 0, the equilibrium is equal to the equilibrium of the CC-subgame. (iii) Firm and industry profits decrease compared to the case in which no relative performance evaluation is used, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The stages of the DD-subgame, discussed in this section, are as follows. First, the owners simultaneously set the incentive contracts I M i for the marketing managers by choosing µ i . Subsequently, the production and marketing managers bargain over the transfer price w i ≥ 0. Finally, the marketing managers determine the output quantity that is put on the market q i ≥ 0.
One may expect that the softening effect of decentralization (partially) offsets the belligerent effect of relative performance evaluation, potentially resulting in higher
(the symmetric equilibrium value of µ i in the CC-subgame) and both firms are decentralized, for large enough α the profits exceed those of two decentralized firms not using relative performance evaluation. In fact, there exists a value for α such that the perfectly collusive outcome is attained. 16 The problem with this reasoning, however, is that the equilibrium values of µ i , if both firms are decentralized, differ from the case in which both firms are centralized.
As the effect of decentralization becomes more salient, i.e., as α becomes larger, the equilibrium value of µ i decreases from − We denote α o the value of α for which π DD (α) equals the standard Cournot profits. Note that π DD (α) increases monotonically in α, with π DD (0) = π CC , and
is larger than the standard 16 Denoting this value of α as e α (in the presence of relative performance evaluation), it is easy to show that e α > b α (in the absence of relative performance evaluation): relative performance evaluation must be offset by a larger degree of decentralization to reach the profit maximizing outcome. 17 For a specific range of α, apart from the unique symmetric solution, there are also asymmetric solutions. Even if these solutions form an equilibrium in the DD-subgame, they do not constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game. The (symmetric and asymmetric) solutions to the DD-subgame are provided in Appendix 3. The determination of the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game is discussed in Appendix 5.
Cournot profits, i.e., the softening effect of decentralization outweighs the aggressive effect of relative performance evaluation.
Endogenization of compensation systems: DC -subgame
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we have discussed the cases where the firms are either both centralized or decentralized. The case where one firm is decentralized (firm D), while the other is centralized (firm C), is analyzed in this section. 18 The questions we address here are as follows. What compensation systems are adopted by the centralized and decentralized firms? How does the introduction of relative performance evaluation affect the market outcome?
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that one firm is centralized, while the other is decentralized. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized as follows.
(i) The centralized firm uses a compensation system that encourages cooperation ( µ CD > 0). The decentralized firm uses a compensation system that discourages cooperation ( µ DC < 0).
(ii) Industry profits are maximized, i.e., total profits equal the monopoly profits.
(iii) If α = 1, firms divide the industry profits evenly. As α decreases ( 0 < α < 1), the profits of the decentralized firm increase, while the profits of the centralized firm decrease.
The stages of this subgame are as follows. First, the firms determine the incentive contract I M i for the marketing managers by choosing µ i . Second, the production and marketing managers of firm D bargain over the transfer price w D , while there is no transfer price in firm C (equivalently, one can state w C = c). Finally, the marketing managers determine the output quantity.
The game is solved, as before, by backwards induction. The values of µ i that simultaneously maximize the firms' profits are given by
Note that µ CD = 1 implies that the manager of firm C is incentivized to maximize industry profits, rather than firm profits. This is remarkable, because previous research concludes that firms in the case of strategic substitutes tend to provide negative values for µ. Note, furthermore, that µ CD does not depend on α. This can be interpreted as follows. The decentralized firm can force the centralized firm to provide collusive incentives, provided that firm D sets µ
. This means that the decentralized firm has to set a less aggressive incentive structure, i.e., a less negative µ DC , as α increases.
The equilibrium value of the decentralized firm's transfer price is given by w DC = a for 0 < α ≤ 1,where the demand parameter a equals the market choke price. It seems unlikely that an internal transfer price that is as high as the choke price allows for positive output by firm D. However, the market price could be lower than the transfer price without forcing firm D to shut down, because the incentive of the marketing manager could be negative, i.e., I (2 − α), ∀µ D 6 = 1. A change in µ D has two effects on q DC , which cancel each other out. Note that a decrease of µ D would make the marketing manager more aggressive, which would increase q DC . At the same time, the marketing manager's higher demand would increase the transfer price, completely offsetting the first effect.
In equilibrium, the centralized firm's output is given by q DC = a 4b α. Thus, the total industry output Q and the market price P, for 0 < α ≤ 1, is given by Q = a 2b = Q M and P = 1 2 a = P M , where the superscript M denotes the monopoly outcome. If one firm is centralized and the other decentralized, in equilibrium and independent of the division of bargaining power, the industry attains the collusive or monopoly outcome. Thus, in an environment that is perfectly noncooperative and that is expected to make firms aggressive, tacit collusion occurs and industry profits are maximized.
The firms' profits, in equilibrium, are given by
α. The division of the industry profits across the two firms thus depends on the parameter α. If α = 1, i.e., if the production manager has all the bargaining power, profits are split evenly between the two firms:
. As α decreases, the decentralized firm can set a more aggressive incentive structure and still compel the centralized firm to behave in a collusive fashion. 19 The analysis of this subgame in terms of its reaction functions and the nature of competition provides some intuition. The second stage of the model, i.e., when firms choose µ i , could be seen as determining the reaction functions of the managers in stage 4 (Cournot competition). 20 Folding back the optimal values for q i and w D , the reaction functions in the DC-subgame are given by
19 For relatively small values of α, the difference in the profits of the centralized and the decentralized firm becomes large, while decentralization becomes less salient (if α = 0 the effect of decentralization disappears, i.e., the game becomes CC). This seems counterintuitive. However, as will be discussed in the next section, the DC-subgame is not subgame-perfect for small values of α, so this problem is merely hypothetical. 20 Rather than studying reaction functions, Faulí-Oller and Giralt (1995) study competition in supply functions as the reduced form of a strategic incentives game. Supply function competition is discussed by, among others, Vives (1999).
Interestingly, in this model, firms have the possibility of altering not only the intercept but also the slope of the reaction curve. This contrasts with the model used by Fershtman and Judd (1987) , in which only the intercept and not the slope can be changed. The firms can thus choose whether they compete in strategic substitutes or complements. More specifically, firm i competes in complements (upward sloping reaction curve) if µ i < −1, while it competes in substitutes (downward sloping reaction curve) if µ i > −1.
Substituting µ DC and µ CD into q D (.) and q C (.) yields q D (q C ; α) = 2−α α q C , and
− q D . Consequently, in the equilibrium of the game, firm D's reaction curve is upward sloping, while the one of firm C is downward sloping. In Figure 4 , the reaction curves of both firms are depicted for α = 1 and for 0 < α < 1. Our game is similar to this class of games, except that the firm in our game has restricted, as opposed to unrestricted, control over the slope and intercept, the restrictions being provided in the reaction functions above. These restrictions are implicitly defined by the structure of the extensive form game, in which the organizational structure, compensation systems, transfer prices, and output quantities are determined. The effect of these restrictions is that the multiplicity of equilibria is dramatically reduced. In fact, this subgame has a unique equilibrium, maximizing industry profits.
Similarly to our study, Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai (1991) find tacit collusion in Cournot duopoly. The main difference between Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai and other papers in the strategic incentives literature, including the present paper, is that Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai assume that managers' strategies can be conditioned not only on their own compensation, but also on the compensation schemes of rival managers. Similar to the multiplicity found in the LUIC games described above, Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai find that every collusive outcome can be obtained in their setup, because of the high degree of control firms have in defining managers' strategies. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai, we find tacit collusion as a result of assumptions reflecting managerial practices.
In Sections 3.2 -3.4, we have discussed the three distinct subgames of the overall model. In the next section, the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game, i.e., endogenizing both compensation systems and organizational structure, is discussed.
Solution of the complete model
In the first stage of the overall model, the firms simultaneously determine the organizational structure, i.e., before the compensation structure, transfer prices, and output quantities are established. Given the optimal actions in the latter stages, one can describe the first stage choices in a 2 x 2 matrix, containing the four subgames (CC, DD, DC, and CD). The Nash equilibrium of this 2 x 2 game constitutes the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game. The payoffs are summarized in the following table.
Centralization Decentralization Proposition 3.5. There exist 0 < α o < α * < 1 such that the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game in which both organizational structure and compensation systems are endogenized is characterized as follows:
(i) If 0 < α < α * , both firms are decentralized and use the same compensation system, which encourages the managers to increase output (µ 1 = µ 2 < 0).
(ii) If α * < α ≤ 1, one firm is decentralized and uses a compensation system that encourages managers to increase output (µ DC < 0), while the other firm is centralized and uses a compensation system that encourages managers to decrease output (µ CD > 0).
(iii) If 0 < α ≤ α o , both firms attain profits lower than, or equal to, standard Cournot. 21 For simplicity, we assume here that the off-equilibrium strategies in the DD-and CC-subgames are symmetric. Appendix 5 shows that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We do not impose restrictions on the equilibrium strategies themselves.
(iv) If α o < α ≤ 1, both firms attain profits higher than standard Cournot.
The following figure shows how the profits of both firms in the equilibrium of the overall model vary with parameter α. We define α * as the value of α for which the profits of the centralized firm in the DC-subgame equal those of the symmetric DD solution (denoted DD − s), i.e.,
. If α is small (α < α * ), the equilibrium is thus unique: DD − s.
For large α, there are two equilibria that are each other's mirror image: DC and CD. If α = 1, the centralized and decentralized firms produce the same quantity and obtain the same profits. Propositions 3.1 -3.3 suggest that profits decrease if firms use organizational design as a strategic commitment device. This is consistent with previous research that consistently finds that, in the case of competition in strategic substitutes, endogenizing either organizational structure or compensation systems increases firm aggressiveness and decreases profits. In contrast, we show that endogenizing both organizational structure and compensation systems softens competition and increases firm profits for α o < α ≤ 1. In the situation discussed in this paper, the ubiquitous prisoner's dilemma of strategic incentives is solved.
We now briefly discuss for each subgame whether it comprises a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game. The CC-subgame does not constitute a subgameperfect equilibrium, because at least one firm in the CC-subgame would want to defect to the DC-subgame. 22 The DD-subgame has a unique symmetric equilibrium and may have up to four asymmetric solutions, depending on α (see Appendix 3).
The asymmetric solutions can never constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall model, because, for 0 < α ≤ 1, the less aggressive firm (i.e., with a less negative µ) could always increase its profits by defecting to the DC-subgame. For 0 < α ≤ α * , the symmetric solution to the DD-subgame constitutes a subgameperfect equilibrium of the overall model, because then π
Discussion and Conclusion
The internal organization of a firm and the compensation schemes used for its management affect the incentives that guide managers' decision-making. While previous research has focused largely on internally-oriented decision-making, this paper explores the effect of organizational design on decisions that directly influence productmarket competition. In this study, we try to elucidate how internal characteristics of firms, i.e., their organizational structure and compensation systems, affect the interaction between firms.
One of the main conclusions of the strategic incentives literature is that the strategic use of organizational design makes firms overly aggressive if they compete in strategic substitutes. This finding is based on the notion that organizational design is used as a commitment device, permitting the firm to benefit from its rivals' reactions. Numerous studies, dealing with different kinds of organizational structures, compensation schemes, and other features, such as transfer pricing, have confirmed these conclusions. One problem with these studies, however, is that organizational features are studied in isolation, i.e., neglecting a possible interaction between them. This is potentially misleading because firms typically face multiple, possibly interdependent, decisions about their organizational design, such as the organizational structure and reward systems.
In our model, organizational structure and compensation schemes are studied simultaneously. Firms choose whether they operate in a centralized or in a vertically decentralized form, i.e., delegating operational decisions to production and marketing departments. Moreover, firms decide whether to use absolute or relative performance evaluation, and, in the latter case, determine the weight put on their rivals' profits. In this setup, we show that the interaction between organizational structure and compensation systems is nontrivial. Indeed, we find that simultaneous determination of organizational structure and compensation systems may enable firms to tacitly collude and achieve the perfectly collusive outcome, despite the noncooperative setting.
One of our findings is that otherwise identical firms, for certain parameter values, choose to be different. If the bargaining power of the production department in determining the transfer price that the marketing department pays is large enough, in equilibrium, one firm is centralized, while the other is decentralized. Moreover, the centralized firm uses an incentive scheme that encourages cooperation between the firms, while the decentralized firm encourages its manager to compete fiercely.
Firm heterogeneity is an important phenomenon in the strategy literature and, to some extent, in the economics literature. For example, Hermalin (1994) tries to find an answer to the question, "why otherwise identical firms choose different incentives for their managers" (p. 518). He argues that the best response to strong incentives can be to provide weak incentives, and vice versa. The reason for the heterogeneity found by Hermalin is the combination of product-market competition and nonconvexities introduced by the underlying agency problem. We find endogenous firm heterogeneity in the absence of an agency problem, i.e., without unobserved efforts.
It is interesting to note that the effect of the organizational structure, in the asymmetric equilibrium, is opposite to that of the incentive schemes. Decentralization, because of double marginalization, makes firms less aggressive, which is counteracted by the aggressive incentive scheme with which the manager is provided.
Similarly, the firm with the more aggressive centralized structure has a cooperative compensation arrangement. Indeed, in the extreme case that the production department has all the bargaining power, these effects cancel each other out, leading to equal division of the collusive profits.
Another noteworthy facet of our model is that firm heterogeneity and performance are positively associated: both firms' profits are strictly larger if the firms are structured differently than if they are similar in terms of organization and compensation systems. The reducing effect of various forms of differentiation on competition has been established pervasively, for example product differentiation (Hotelling, 1929) , strategic dissimilarity (Gimeno and Woo, 1996) , and differentiation of organizational form, size, and therefore resource dependence (Hannan and Freeman, 1977 ). To our knowledge, a decreasing effect of organizational differentiation per se,
i.e., heterogeneity in organizational structure and managerial incentive schemes, on the intensity of rivalry has otherwise not been established, either theoretically or empirically. This could be an interesting avenue for future research.
The concurrence of organizational differentiation and diminished intensity of rivalry could be compared to a phenomenon that often occurs in competitive sailing.
Boats sailing close to each other spoil each other's wind exposure, slowing down both vessels. If one boat tags-one firm chooses a different organizational structure-the negative externality is removed. Subsequently, both boats may tag again, sailing over different boards-firms use different incentive schemes-but aiming for a common windward destination. In the end, the boats may reach the same destination, but more rapidly than if they had chosen to sail similar routes. The use of different organizational structures and incentive schemes may reduce competition and increase profits, without necessarily benefiting one firm more than the other. Assuming O i O j = DD, the optimal output quantity is given by
The transfer price that maximizes the production department's profits is equal to . It is easy to verify that b π
, which equals half the monopoly profits. This completes the proof of first and second parts of Proposition 3.1.
Assuming O i O j = DC, the equilibrium output quantities are given by
The transfer price that maximizes the production department's profits is equal to 
The first order condition in stage 2 yields the following expression for q i as a function of µ i and µ j :
The first order condition in stage 1 yields a continuum of solutions:
The second order condition is satisfied for µ i < . This completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 3.2.
Total industry output is independent of the value of µ i , because as µ i increases (decreases) in equilibrium µ j decreases (increases), completely offsetting the effect of µ i . The equilibrium industry output, price, and firm profits are given by Q = . Note that the output is larger than the output in standard Cournot without relative performance evaluation ( 2a 3b
) and the profits are smaller than in Cournot (
). This completes the proof of the second part of Proposition 
Solving the second stage yields:
In the first stage, owner i maximizes overall firm profits by setting an optimal µ i .
Firm profits expressed in µ i and µ j are given by
where f (µ i , µ j ; α) is a polynomial including µ Assuming symmetry, one can simplify, writing µ = µ 1 = µ 2 . The solutions to the following polynomial of the fifth degree provide the optimal values for µ:
This polynomial yields five solutions, of which four can be deleted (for 0 < α ≤ 1), because they are either imaginary or yield negative w, q, or P. Again, given that α is unknown (even if restricted to a value of between 0 and 1), there is no explicit, general solution for this polynomial. However, solving numerically for specific values of α is possible.
If α = 0, the condition becomes 3µ 5 − 11µ 4 − 58µ 3 + 306µ 2 − 297µ − 135 = 0, which can be written as: (α = 0) to π i = 0.12
Thus, as α increases, the transfer price increases, which reduces output because of double marginalization, which, in turn, is partially offset by a decreasing µ. Overall, the output quantity decreases in the direction of the monopoly or collusive output, increasing firm and industry profits (for ease of reference, denote firm profits in the symmetric DD-case as π
DD−s i
). This completes the proof of part two of Proposition 3.3.
Next, we compare these results with the situation in which µ i = 0. In Appendix 1, the profits of two decentralized firms without relative performance evaluation
(3 + 2α)(3 − α), 0 < α ≤ 1. Evaluated at α = 0 and α = 1, respectively, this expression has a value of . This subgame consists of three stages, in which, respectively, µ i , w i , and q i are determined. In Section 3.4, the DC-subgame is discussed in relative detail, so that the discussion here will be brief.
In equilibrium, the incentive parameters are as follows: µ DC = α−4 α and µ CD = 1.
Thus, for 0 < α < 1, µ DC < 0 and µ CD > 0, which completes the proof of the first part of Proposition 3.4.
Industry profits are equal to
independent of α, which equals the monopoly profits. This proves the second part of Proposition 3.4.
The profits of the decentralized firm are given by π DC = a 2 8b
(2 − α), which decreases in α. The profits of the centralized firm are given by π DC = a 2 8b
α, which increases in α. If α = 1, the profits of both firms are equal to
. This completes the proof of the third part of Proposition 3.4. ¤ Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 3.5.
The SPE of the overall game is determined by comparing the equilibrium profits of the four subgames (CC, CD, DC, and DD). In Section 3.5, each subgame is evaluated as a candidate for the SPE. A subgame is SPE (for a certain value of α) if there is no unilateral deviation possible that increases the payoff of a player. Here, we follow the same structure and provide some details that have been omitted in Section 3.5.
The CC-subgame does not constitute an SPE. Note that π CC−s i < π DC ∀α, which precludes CC − s to be an SPE. Moreover, since π CC L < π CC−s i < π DC ∀α, asymmetric solutions to the CC-subgame cannot be an SPE, either.
Asymmetric DD-subgames do not constitute an SPE. Note that π DD LL < π DD L < π CD ∀α, which means that the firm that obtains low profits in the asymmetric DD-subgame could increase its payoffs by defecting to DC.
For low enough α (α < α * = 0.95), DD − s is an SPE, because π CD < π
, which means that defecting to DC would not increase the firm's profits. For α > α * , DD − s does not constitute an SPE.
Whether the DC-and CD-subgames constitute SPEs depends on the off-equilibrium path strategies, i.e., the strategies that are related to the DD-and CC-subgames.
Assume first (for simplicity) that the equilibria on the off-equilibrium path are re-stricted to being symmetric. Now, we explore whether the decentralized (central- Consequently, if the off-equilibrium path strategies are symmetric, DC is an SPE for α > α * .
However, if the centralized firm could obtain the high or very high profits (remember that there are two pairs of asymmetric solutions) in the asymmetric DD−subgame, this would increase its profits, and therefore DC (for α > α * ) would not be an SPE.
The same reasoning holds if the decentralized firm could obtain high profits in an asymmetric CC subgame, with the understanding that the CC-subgame has a continuum of asymmetric solutions, rather than two pairs of asymmetric solutions.
The equilibrium value for µ 1 (implying µ 2 ), such that π DC = π in the equilibrium of the CC-subgame. As α increases, this restriction becomes more strict, until at α = 1, µ 1 must be larger than −1. In conclusion, the DC-equilibrium is an SPE of the overall game for α > α * , provided that the decentralized firm in DC is not too aggressive in the off-equilibrium CC-subgame. Note again that symmetry in the CC subgame, i.e., µ = − 1 3 , is sufficient, but not necessary, to avoid the risk of defecting to CC.
Finally, consider the possibility that the defecting firm would obtain low rather than high asymmetric profits in the DD-subgame. In this case, DC could also be an SPE for α 0 < α ≤ α * . This would happen if the centralized firm obtained low or very low profits in the DD-subgame (π , as before.
To summarize, the CC-subgame and asymmetric DD-subgame are not SPEs of the overall game. The symmetric solution to the DD-subgame constitutes an SPE, iff α < α * , without any restrictions on the off-equilibrium path strategies.
The DC-and CD-subgames are SPEs for α > α * , iff the off-equilibrium strategies in the DD-subgame yield low, very low, or symmetric profits for the firm that is centralized in DC/CD, and the off-equilibrium strategy in the CC-subgame of firm D satisfies µ 1 > 2α−3 2α−1
. The DC-and CD-subgames are SPEs for α 0 < α < α * , iff the off-equilibrium strategies in the DD-subgame yield low or very low profits for firm C, and the off-equilibrium strategy in the CC-subgame of firm D satisfies µ 1 > 2α−3 2α−1
. Thus, for α < α 0 , the SPE is unique, for α 0 < α < α * , three equilibria exist (DD − s, DC, and CD), and for α > α * , two equilibria exist that are each other's mirror image (DC and CD).
Assuming symmetry on the off-equilibrium path, the formulation of the SPE is simpler: DD − s is an SPE for 0 < α < α * (first part of Proposition 3.5) and DC and CD are equilibria for α * < α ≤ 1 (part two of Proposition 3. Thus, the use of decentralization and relative performance evaluation in combination increases profits iff α > α o . This completes the proof of the fourth part of Proposition 3.5. ¤
